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Abstract  21 
 22 
To make progress scientists need to know what other researchers have found and how they found it. 23 
However, transparency is often insufficient across much of ecology and evolution. Researchers often fail 24 
to report results and methods with detail sufficient to permit interpretation and meta-analysis, and 25 
many results go entirely unreported. Further, these unreported results are often a biased subset. Thus 26 
the conclusions we can draw from the published literature are themselves often biased and sometimes 27 
might be entirely incorrect. Fortunately there is a movement across empirical disciplines, and now 28 
within ecology and evolution, to shape editorial policies to better promote transparency. This can be 29 
done by either requiring more disclosure by scientists or by developing incentives to encourage 30 
disclosure. 31 
 32 
  33 
3 
 
Science needs transparency 34 
 35 
Science is a uniquely effective tool for understanding the world, and ecologists and evolutionary 36 
biologists have built a robust body of scientific knowledge over the past century. However, several 37 
common practices are limiting progress in these fields. For science to progress, results and clear 38 
explanations of methods must be shared with other scientists.  Although this fundamental principle is 39 
widely understood, practices that cloud transparency of methods and results, such as selective reporting 40 
(see glossary), appear far more common than they should be. This is unlikely to be an issue of deliberate 41 
dishonesty, which we assume is rare in ecology and evolution. Instead, we believe that the unintended 42 
negative consequences of insufficient transparency are often unrecognized by many members of the 43 
scientific community. In addition, the institutions that shape our choices often inadvertently encourage 44 
or reward choices that obstruct transparency [1]. Without sufficient transparency, we are hindered in 45 
our ability to interpret published findings, conclusions based on published literature can be biased or 46 
wrong, and meta-analytical syntheses are weakened [2]. Although these challenges to transparency vary 47 
across disciplines and sub-disciplines, evidence suggests they are often common and present very real 48 
problems for the advancement of ecology and evolutionary biology. In this paper, we first review 49 
evidence of insufficient transparency in ecology and evolutionary biology, and then discuss new efforts 50 
in these fields and in empirical science in general to improve transparency and thus improve scientific 51 
progress.  52 
 53 
 54 
Evidence of insufficient transparency 55 
 56 
Selective reporting - Once researchers have collected and analyzed data, they commonly publish only a 57 
portion of the results derived from these data (Fig. 1). Such selective reporting can lead to publication 58 
bias (see glossary) if researchers preferentially publish certain types of results, such as those with the 59 
strongest or the most surprising patterns. However, selective reporting is not limited to the classic ‘file-60 
drawer’ problem in which a study that does not produce the hoped-for result goes unpublished (e.g., 61 
[3]). For instance, researchers might conduct multiple alternative forms of an analysis and report only 62 
the one with the strongest relationships or lowest p-values. This practice has become known as ‘p-63 
hacking’ (see glossary) [4, 5]. P-hacking and other forms of selective reporting can be masked by 64 
‘HARKing’, or Hypothesizing After Results are Known (see glossary)[6]. We might convince ourselves of 65 
the validity of selective reporting in various ways. For instance, human cognitive tendencies, such as 66 
confirmation bias (see glossary) (Box 1)[7], can lead researchers to select evidence that lends the 67 
clearest support for a pre-existing hypothesis. Alternatively, selective reporting might not seem 68 
problematic as researchers often tend to be more interested in the existence of patterns than in their 69 
absence. However, ignoring weak, negative, or absent patterns is a major hindrance to our 70 
understanding of the biological world. First, the absence of an effect or the presence of only a weak 71 
effect is itself important as we sort through explanations of how biological systems work. Second, any 72 
observed statistical relationship is an estimate of a true biological relationship, and as an estimate, it is 73 
inherently uncertain. Sampling variance results in some estimates being higher than the true value, and 74 
some lower (Type M errors; see glossary), and some being even opposite in sign (Type S error; see 75 
glossary) [8]. If we systematically eliminate the smaller or contradictory effect sizes (see glossary) from 76 
publication, we get a biased picture of the size of the true underlying effect, and under some 77 
circumstances this bias can be extreme [2]. Methods exist for estimating the effect of publication bias in 78 
meta-analysis, but these methods are imperfect because most are indirect and thus must make major 79 
assumptions about missing unpublished results whose true values we can never know [9]. Therefore, 80 
the clearest path towards a reliable average is minimizing bias in the original sample of statistical effects 81 
[2]. The selective reporting behind much publication bias clearly varies among sub-disciplines and with 82 
the type of data reported, but evidence suggests it is common in many areas of ecology and evolution, 83 
as in many other scientific disciplines. Most authors of this manuscript have engaged in selective 84 
reporting at one or more points in their pasts, sometimes at the request of reviewers or editors, and 85 
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anecdotal evidence from conversations with others suggest it could be widespread and frequent. 86 
However, it is not just our personal experience that suggests selective reporting is common. There is 87 
considerable published empirical evidence for publication bias in ecology and evolutionary biology. 88 
 89 
Under-reporting (see glossary) is the easiest form of selective reporting to document because we know 90 
the analysis was completed; the paper just fails to provide all the details of results or statistical methods. 91 
For instance, studies sometimes include means with no indication of uncertainty around those means, p-92 
values with no indication of the direction of the trend, or statistical results without the sample size for 93 
the particular subset of data examined. These practices all limit readers’ abilities to build an unbiased 94 
understanding of a system and severely limit the usefulness of data for meta-analysis. A long and 95 
growing list of surveys and meta-analyses has documented widespread under-reporting across many of 96 
our sub-disciplines. Studies in fields including conservation [10], plant ecology [11], behavioral ecology 97 
[12], ecosystem ecology [13, 14], community ecology [15], and others [16, 17] often find that around 98 
half of published articles lack at least one key piece of information regarding statistical relationships 99 
(Table 1). Further, where it has been examined these under-reported results were more likely to come 100 
from non-significant comparisons or patterns contradictory to the primary hypothesis [18]. Finally, even 101 
if authors report statistical results, they often do not report how the analyses were conducted in 102 
sufficient detail, which makes it impossible for readers to critique the statistical methodology and to 103 
replicate the analyses. 104 
 105 
Estimating the rate at which results go completely unreported is more challenging. Results could remain 106 
hidden from comparisons that authors decided were uninteresting. Unreported results might also come 107 
from alternative versions of analyses conducted with, for instance, different covariates, interactions, or 108 
subsets of data, as we might expect from p-hacking. One proposed method for identifying p-hacking is 109 
‘p-curve’ analysis, which predicts a clumping of p-values just below 0.05 if p-hacking is common [5]. 110 
Recently p-curve analysis was used to argue that p-hacking was having only modest impacts on biology 111 
[4]. Regrettably, this reassuring conclusion is unwarranted. First, when researchers can include or 112 
exclude covariates depending on their effects on p-values, p-values much smaller than 0.05 can often be 113 
generated in the absence of a real effect [19, 20]. Thus, p-curve analysis focused on a 0.05 threshold can 114 
dramatically underestimate p-hacking in fields where multiple covariates are common [19], such as 115 
much of ecology and evolutionary biology. In fact, p-values have been shown to clump under lower 116 
thresholds (0.01, 0.001, etc.) as well [21], as would be expected if p-hacking often ended with 117 
calculation of a “highly significant” p-value. However, the second problem with these analyses is that 118 
assumptions about the expected distribution of a collection of published p-values are almost certainly 119 
incorrect, and thus inferring bias from the ‘p-curve’ is untenable under most conditions [22]. 120 
 121 
There are, however, other ways to estimate the magnitude of selective reporting. We can compare rates 122 
of publication of statistically significant results with the observed distribution of statistical power (see 123 
glossary) and estimates of average strength of effect. Rates of publication of statistically significant 124 
effects are very high. In “Environment/Ecology” and “Plant and Animal Sciences”, 74% of 150 and 78% of 125 
200 statistical tests, each from a different randomly selected paper, were statistically significant and 126 
supported the researchers’ putative a priori hypotheses [23]. Similarly, in a cross-section of biological 127 
journals, many from the disciplines of ecology and evolution, only 8.6% presented non-significant tests 128 
of the main hypothesis [24]. Part of the explanation for these numbers is likely to be HARKing, in which 129 
authors choose their strongest patterns and build the paper around those results, either de-emphasizing 130 
or leaving out other results. While in some sub-fields of ecology and evolution researchers might often 131 
test hypotheses that are likely to be true, this is probably not the case across all of ecology and 132 
evolution. Further, even if most of our hypotheses were true, the proportion of statistically significant 133 
results should be much lower since many of our studies have low statistical power. This low power 134 
results from sample sizes that are often small, and average effect sizes that are also relatively small (|r| 135 
= 0.19 [25], which should actually be an overestimate [26]) and thus difficult to detect (Box 2). The 136 
resulting statistical power to detect effects of this observed average magnitude in the behavior, ecology, 137 
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and evolution literature is in the neighborhood of 20% [27, 28] (Box 2). If we thus conclude that typical 138 
power is about 20% and we assume that 74% of tested hypotheses are true, we would still expect only 139 
16% of findings to be statistically significant (Box 3) rather than 74%. This is a strong indication of 140 
HARKing and selective reporting. Further, we discuss evidence below which suggests that published 141 
statistically significant results might often be false or inflated relative to the true effect.  142 
 143 
Sources of bias - The proportion of significant results that are false positives is, somewhat counter-144 
intuitively, increased in studies with small samples and low power [29]. This increase happens because 145 
the probability of detecting a true positive declines as power is reduced but the probability of detecting 146 
a false positive remains fixed (typically at 0.05). As a consequence a greater proportion of positives will 147 
be false as power decreases (Box 3). This means that reports of significant findings with low sample size 148 
should be disproportionately likely to be incorrect [30], and of course such underpowered studies are 149 
common in much of ecology and evolutionary biology [27].  150 
 151 
Insufficient statistical power also hinders detection of real effects, and Type II errors (see glossary) 152 
should thus also be common in ecology and evolution [31]. In fact, we predict that Type II error, when 153 
they occur, will often go hand and hand with Type I error, as p-hacking extracts false positives from data 154 
while true relationships go undetected. As described above, the rarity of negative results in the 155 
literature suggests that Type II error is often concealed by HARKing, selective reporting, or both. 156 
 157 
Much of our focus in this paper is on null hypothesis tests because these tests remain the most common 158 
type of statistical analyses in ecology and evolution. However, it is important to note that most of the 159 
choices related to sample size and selective reporting that can bias null hypothesis tests can bias other 160 
threshold tests (e.g., Akaike information criterion: ΔAIC > 2 [32]) and can also generate misleading and 161 
inflated effect sizes. For instance, large effects reported from studies with small samples are likely to 162 
often be inflated, or even of the wrong sign [30]. Examination of 3867 ecological studies from 52 163 
previously published meta-analyses showed that studies with the largest effect sizes tended to have the 164 
lowest samples sizes [33]. Further, ‘p-hacking’ could also be considered ‘effect-size hacking’ since the 165 
same practices produce inflated effect sizes, and if combined with selective reporting, produce a 166 
distribution of published effects that is biased upwards.  167 
 168 
Given that studies with larger effects could be more likely to end up in journals with higher impact 169 
scores [34], perhaps high impact journals are often publishing studies with large effects despite their 170 
small samples and unreliability.  Although there is evidence that in some subsets of the published 171 
literature sample size and journal impact factor are negatively correlated, this trend appears to vary 172 
across study types, and when averaged across a large number of studies (n = 3867), impact factor was 173 
uncorrelated with sample size [33]. While this lack of correlation is certainly better than a consistent 174 
negative correlation, given that studies with larger samples produce more reliable results, it would 175 
actually be preferable to see a positive relationship between sample size and journal impact factor. 176 
Further, it is effect size, not sample size, that predicts the number of citations a study receives [33]. So, 177 
not only are published studies with small sample sizes more likely to report inflated effects (i.e. more 178 
prone to Type M errors), the unreliability of these studies does not dependably deter their publication in 179 
high impact journals or their accumulation of citations. 180 
 181 
It has long been established that as the number of statistical comparisons increases, the probability of 182 
observing patterns that result only from chance (i.e., false positives) also increases [35]. This happens 183 
both with multiple separate tests or if, instead of alternative tests, we combine multiple possible 184 
predictors in the same model [36]. Within a single model we might include a set of different equally 185 
plausible predictors of the variable of interest, or we might include multiple alternative interaction 186 
terms between our predictor of interest and different covariates. In a survey of 50 randomly selected 187 
studies from ecology and evolution, 28 studies (56%) used GLMs with two or more predictors [36], and 188 
none of these 28 considered any type of correction for multiple comparisons to counter the risk of 189 
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inflated significance.  We could not locate other attempts to quantify failures to correct for multiple 190 
comparisons, but uncorrected multiple comparisons appear common in at least some portions of the 191 
literature [12]. Although false positives from multiple comparisons in exploratory analyses need not be a 192 
major problem if we recognize the provisional nature of the results [35], two current practices in our 193 
disciplines make uncorrected multiple comparisons a severe issue. First, multiple comparisons are often 194 
hidden, with researchers conducting multiple tests but only reporting a subset of them. Thus the 195 
likelihood that a result is a false positive is concealed and the scientific community is misled about the 196 
probability that the result is true. Second, calls for tolerating a high false positive rate (to reduce Type II 197 
errors) emphasize the importance of validating findings with replication studies [35], but replications or 198 
other types of independent evaluation are currently far too rare to sort out the false from the true 199 
positives [37, 38].  200 
 201 
The role of institutions - The problems outlined above are heavily influenced by the institutions that 202 
shape the decisions of researchers, including journals, funding bodies, and employers. Calls for 203 
individual scientists to improve transparency are not uncommon [e.g., 39, 40, 41], and scientists 204 
sometimes respond to these calls. However, individual scientists, like all people, make decisions in 205 
response to the institutions in which they operate [1]. Funders reward novelty, typically to the complete 206 
exclusion of replication, and journals preferentially publish statistically significant findings, especially if 207 
those findings are surprising. These factors alone would influence researchers’ decisions, but these 208 
incentives are even more influential because universities and research institutes often hire and promote 209 
scientists based on their record of acquiring grant money and the number and impact factors of their 210 
publications [1]. Thus to increase transparency, we should identify components of this incentive 211 
structure amenable to improvement.  212 
 213 
Some solutions to improve transparency 214 
 215 
There is growing recognition of the problems hindering empirical progress and of the role that 216 
institutions must play in shaping science in ecology, evolutionary biology, and beyond [42-44]. In 217 
November 2015, representatives (mostly editors-in-chief) from nearly 30 journals in ecology and 218 
evolution joined funding agency panelists and other researchers to identify ways to improve 219 
transparency in these disciplines. At this workshop, strong support emerged for the recently introduced 220 
Transparency and Openness Promotion (TOP) framework (https://cos.io/top/)[45]. TOP currently 221 
consists of eight guidelines that can be implemented by journals and funding agencies. Institutions can 222 
adopt whichever of the eight guidelines they choose, and they can implement these guidelines along a 223 
gradient of stringency. The rapid and extensive spread of support for TOP (>500 journals in < 1 year) 224 
across scientific disciplines appears to herald a revolution in transparency standards.  225 
 226 
Several TOP guidelines simply request or require more thorough reporting of methods, results, data, or 227 
analysis code. Ecologists and evolutionary biologists made important progress in this regard several 228 
years ago when a growing number of journals began requiring the archiving of data [46].  Calls for more 229 
expanded archiving are growing in ecology and evolution [47], and the TOP guidelines can facilitate the 230 
expansion of these types of disclosures. Interestingly, an incentive to archive in the form of a badge 231 
appears similarly effective [48] as requiring archiving [49] and could therefore eliminate much of the 232 
controversy regarding archiving [e.g., 50]. However, challenges remain, such as ensuring inclusion of 233 
sufficient metadata [49]. The TOP guideline titled ‘analysis and design transparency’ calls for discipline-234 
specific guidance regarding what information should be disclosed in publications, and to that end, the 235 
workshop produced a document ‘Tools for Transparency in Ecology and Evolution’ (TTEE; 236 
https://osf.io/g65cb/) that provides checklist questions that journals can provide to authors, reviewers, 237 
and editors to facilitate transparent reporting. Promoting more thorough and consistent reporting of 238 
results and methods through TOP and TTEE should dramatically improve transparency, but here we also 239 
highlight two other TOP components that could have transformative impacts on our field.  240 
 241 
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Pre-registration (see glossary), in which researchers register their study and data analysis plan prior to 242 
collecting data, can greatly improve transparency. Although requiring pre-registration (as in clinical trial 243 
research)[51] might thwart publication of valuable exploratory and serendipitous findings in ecology and 244 
evolution, encouraging pre-registration where appropriate has large potential benefits. Most obviously, 245 
it makes unpublished results more discoverable [45], thus helping to reduce publication bias. Potentially 246 
more important, however, pre-registration of analysis plans ensures that we can identify genuine a 247 
priori planned tests, helping to improve confidence in results because they are unlikely to derive from 248 
hidden multiple hypothesis testing and selective reporting. As pre-registration becomes more common, 249 
results that do not come from pre-registered analysis plans become viewed as exploratory, and thus 250 
provisional and less convincing than pre-registered results [52], providing a strong incentive to pre-251 
register studies. We acknowledge that exploratory work is hugely important in ecology and evolutionary 252 
biology and we do not wish to impede it, but it should be more consistently identifiable and it should be 253 
follow-up with planned, ideally pre-registered, tests [35]. A common concern is that pre-registration 254 
ignores the inevitable tweaking of methods that occurs as field projects evolve. However, alterations to 255 
methods or analysis plans can be justified in the published study [e.g., 48]. Reviewers and editors can 256 
decide if the reported methods and analyses adhered closely enough to the pre-registration to earn a 257 
pre-registration badge (https://osf.io/tvyxz/wiki/home/). Further, pre-registered analyses and 258 
exploratory results can be published in the same paper when the distinction between them is made 259 
clear. In an effort to further jump start the pre-registration process, the Center for Open Science 260 
recently announced the Pre-registration Challenge, in which the first thousand researchers to publish 261 
pre-registered research will be awarded US$1000 each (https://cos.io/prereg/). Independently, 262 
institutions promoting systematic reviews in ecology and conservation have also been encouraging pre-263 
registration (http://www.environmentalevidence.org/; http://cebc.bangor.ac.uk/). 264 
 265 
The final TOP guideline promotes replications (see glossary) of previously published studies. Replication 266 
to assess validity and generality of prior results is a core practice of science. Exact replication is not 267 
possible, especially in field studies, but various forms of replication, especially when combined with 268 
meta-analysis, are powerful tools for establishing the applicability of hypotheses [37]. Unfortunately, 269 
institutional incentive structures often work strongly against replication in ecology and evolution, 270 
especially replications that seek to closely match methods as part of the process of assessing validity 271 
[37]. Journals and funding bodies explicitly favor novelty. Of course progress requires novelty, but 272 
progress also requires rigorous evaluation of prior findings. Not all studies are of high priority for 273 
replication. The more interesting or important a finding, however, the more important it is to replicate 274 
that study. Allocating funding to replication would certainly increase its frequency, as would journals 275 
adopting policies that explicitly encourage submission of replications (e.g., 276 
http://biotropica.org/reproducibility-repeatability/). As with any other articles, journals can reject less 277 
valuable replication studies. For instance, journals might require sample sizes larger than in the original 278 
study, review of methods prior to conducting the research (i.e., ‘registered reports’; see glossary) [53], 279 
or replications only of original studies that cross some threshold of impact or interest. Replication is an 280 
essential part of doing science in other fields, as, for example, anyone who remembers the ‘cold fusion 281 
in a jar’ debacle of 1989 can attest [54].  282 
 283 
As institutions in ecology and evolutionary biology more vigorously promote transparency, we will 284 
become better able to evaluate the results we read, the average result will be more reliable, and there 285 
will be clearer paths for empirical progress (Fig. 1). We need to deliberately shape the institutions in 286 
which we operate to best facilitate scientific progress. Not all institutions will be equally responsive to 287 
attempts at reform. However, we already know that journals can take deliberate steps to increase 288 
transparency [46], and in response to the TTEE workshop mentioned above, nearly 30 ecology and 289 
evolution journals are engaged in ongoing discussions about adopting TOP guidelines or have already 290 
adopted these guidelines. Funding agencies have also implemented data archiving policies [46] and 291 
could promote transparency in multiple other ways as guided by TOP. The proposals we review here are 292 
only a subset of possible solutions to insufficient transparency. We hope to stimulate a continuing 293 
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exploration of these issues. This is an historic crossroads for the practice of science in ecology and 294 
evolutionary biology, and for empirical disciplines in general [45].   295 
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Glossary  307 
  308 
Blind observation: The observer (person making measurements) is unaware of the group membership 309 
(e.g., treatment condition) of the subject being measured 310 
 311 
Confirmation bias: The widespread human tendency to interpret observations as consistent with one’s 312 
belief about how the world works or to preferentially search for and recall such observations 313 
 314 
Effect size: A measure of study outcome that indicates the magnitude and direction of the outcome of 315 
each study. Effect sizes can be based on the magnitude of difference between groups or the strength of 316 
the correlation between variables. Effect sizes can be unstandardized (e.g., mean difference or 317 
covariance) or standardized (e.g., Cohen’s d or correlation coefficient).  318 
 319 
Exploratory analysis: conducting many graphical and/or statistical comparisons in an effort to identify 320 
previously unidentified relationships among variables in a data set 321 
 322 
False positive: In null hypothesis testing, a rejection of the null hypothesis when the null hypothesis is 323 
actually true (Type I error) 324 
 325 
HARKing: Hypothesizing After Results are Known – presenting a post hoc explanation for an exploratory 326 
result as though it were an a priori hypothesis. Many of us were taught to HARK and to write papers as 327 
though we were testing a priori hypotheses even if we were conducting exploratory analyses. Although 328 
philosophers debate the importance of distinguishing between a priori and post hoc hypotheses, 329 
HARKing is problematic even if one discounts this distinction. This is because HARKing often serves to 330 
conceal selective reporting of exploratory analyses (often without a deliberate attempt to deceive), and 331 
thus skews the distribution of reported results. 332 
 333 
Inflated effect size: An estimated effect size that is larger than the actual effect size, for instance 334 
because the researcher selected the covariate that led to the largest effect in the target relationship 335 
after testing multiple covariates 336 
 337 
Meta-analysis: The quantitative synthesis of the outcomes of different studies, based on combining 338 
effect sizes, to determine overall results across studies and sources of heterogeneity in outcomes among 339 
studies. Generally study outcomes are weighted by the precision with which the effects are estimated. 340 
Meta-regression is a variant of meta-analysis in which the effects of covariates are modeled statistically. 341 
 342 
p-hacking: A variety of practices that increase the odds of finding a statistically significant result by, for 343 
instance, conducting multiple versions of an analysis with different covariates, interactions, or subsets of 344 
data. Some processes that contribute to p-hacking, such as conducting multiple versions of an analysis 345 
with different interaction terms, might be pursued out of a sincere desire to discover the story the data 346 
have to tell. However, each additional version of the analysis increases the risk of a false positive or of 347 
an inflated effect, and unless we disclose all results from all versions of analyses and all decisions 348 
regarding data gathering and analyses, we will contribute to the biased distribution of effects in the 349 
literature. 350 
 351 
Pre-registration: A process by which planned studies, including methods and an analysis plan, are 352 
registered in a secure and accessible platform (e.g. website such as Open Science Framework; 353 
https://osf.io/) before commencement of the research. Once a pre-registration has been submitted, it 354 
cannot be altered. Pre-registrations can be embargoed to protect ideas prior to publication. 355 
 356 
Publication bias: A bias in the distribution of published effect sizes resulting from any number of factors, 357 
including selective reporting by authors and rejection of non-significant results by editors 358 
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 359 
Registered report: A study in which the rationale, methods, and analysis plan are submitted to a journal 360 
for review, and possible revision, with the objective of achieving in-principle acceptance based on the 361 
importance of the question and the quality of the study design, not the outcome, prior to initiation of 362 
the study.  363 
 364 
Replication: a study designed to replicate a previously published result, either by closely following the 365 
original methods in an effort to assess validity (‘direct’ or ‘close’ replication) or by designing a study 366 
inspired by the original concept in an effort to assess generality (‘conceptual replication’) 367 
 368 
Selective reporting: Reporting only a subset of analyses conducted. In medicine, a similar concept is 369 
often referred to as reporting bias. 370 
 371 
Statistical power: The probability of detecting a statistically significant effect if that effect actually exists. 372 
This probability is a function of the significance threshold, sample size, and strength of statistical effect. 373 
 374 
Type I error: Rejection of a null hypothesis when the null hypothesis is true (a ‘false positive’). 375 
 376 
Type II error: a failure to reject a null hypothesis when the null hypothesis is false (a ‘false negative’) 377 
 378 
Type M error: an error in estimating the magnitude of an effect 379 
 380 
Type S error: an error in estimating the sign of an effect 381 
 382 
Under-reporting: Reporting an analysis without sufficient details of analytical methods or results to 383 
allow for interpretation 384 
 385 
 386 
 387 
388 
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Text boxes  389 
 390 
Text Box 1  391 
 392 
Confirmation bias  393 
 394 
People have a strong tendency to interpret observations as supporting their existing worldview and to 395 
seek out evidence in support of this worldview [7]. This can play out in various forms of selective 396 
reporting as we convince ourselves that we are simply focusing our reporting on the real phenomena. 397 
Confirmation bias can thus help rationalize p-hacking and selective reporting, often by preventing us 398 
from recognizing our own subtle HARKing. Confirmation bias can also influence data gathering. Studies 399 
in ecology and evolution in which individuals gathering data were not blind to the treatment condition 400 
or the predicted outcomes showed stronger effects and higher rates of significance than studies with 401 
blinded observers [55, 56].  Blind observation (see Glossary) is quite rare in ecology and evolutionary 402 
biology [57] in part because in some studies blinding is nearly impossible. However, in a large sample of 403 
recent studies, 56% that could have benefited from blinding could also have implemented it with little 404 
difficulty (e.g., no additional personnel), and an additional 22% could have adopted blinding by 405 
employing an observer naïve to certain details of the study [57]. 406 
 407 
  408 
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Text Box 2 409 
 410 
Evidence of low power 411 
 412 
In a sample of 1362 statistical tests from 697 papers published in 2000 in 10 behavior, evolution, and 413 
ecology journals, the average power to detect a small effect (|r| = 0.1) was only 13-16% [27]. In other 414 
words, studies would only be expected to reject a false null hypothesis 13-16% of the time in the case of 415 
weak effects. Power to detect medium (|r| = 0.3) and large (|r| = 0.5) effects, though of course higher 416 
(40-47% and 65-72%, respectively), was still typically well below the commonly recommended threshold 417 
of 80%. Examined another way, the proportion of studies reaching this 80% power threshold to detect 418 
weak effects was 2-3%, 13-21% for medium effects, and 37-50% for strong effects [27]. Other analyses 419 
of power find similar results. For example, an analysis of studies published in Animal Behaviour in 1996, 420 
2003, and 2009 found, across all three years, an average power of just 23-26% for detection of medium 421 
effects and 1-2% for weak effects [28]. It thus appears that studies in ecology and evolution often lack 422 
power to detect small and medium effects, and this is particularly problematic because effects in 423 
ecology and evolution tend to be weak. Average effects across 43 meta-analyses in ecology and 424 
evolutionary biology were found to be weak to moderate (|r| = 0.18-0.19) [25]. Further, these rather 425 
low values are actually overestimates because averages of estimated absolute values of effect size are 426 
upwardly biased [26]. To detect these relatively small effects requires large samples (e.g., n = 207 to 427 
obtain an 80% probability of detecting a true effect of r = 0.193) [25], but obtaining sufficient power 428 
through large samples is rare [27]. 429 
  430 
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Text Box 3 431 
False-positive report probability (FPRP) 432 
 433 
In many sub-fields of evolution and ecology it remains common to use a significance threshold of 5%.  434 
This means that if our null hypothesis were true we would incorrectly reject it 5% of the time. However, 435 
we often incorrectly attribute a frequency of 5% to a different phenomenon:  the chance that a 436 
significant finding is a false positive. This is incorrect because the probability that a positive result is a 437 
false positive depends on three factors (1) the proportion of our hypotheses that are in fact true (π, the 438 
probability that a hypothesis is true), (2) the significance threshold (α), and (3) statistical power (1 – β, 439 
where β is the probability of making a type II error; Table I): FPRP = (α(1 –  π)/[α(1 –  π) + (1 – β)π]. With 440 
50% of our hypotheses true and statistical power of 20% (a power typical in ecology and evolution [25]), 441 
the chance that a significant finding is a false positive is 20%. This value is known as the false positive 442 
report probability [58]. This number is notably larger than 5%, but it becomes dramatically larger when, 443 
in pursuit of novelty, we turn our interest towards testing relatively unlikely hypotheses, those that in 444 
the Bayesian sense could be said to have a low prior probability. For instance, when only 10% of tested 445 
hypotheses are in fact true, the expected false positive report probability rises to 69% ((0.05(1 – 446 
0.1)/((0.05(1 – 0.1) + (0.2)0.1)) [58]! In fact, false positives could be even more prevalent. The above 447 
calculations assume complete and transparent reporting of the full set of analyses conducted, as 448 
promoted by pre-registration and other recently proposed transparency tools. If, in contrast, 449 
researchers make their choices of analysis strategy conditional on the outcome as with p-hacking  (i.e. 450 
preferring test variants that yield significance or stronger effects) then the false-report probability 451 
increases further. 452 
 453 
I. Four possible outcomes from a null hypothesis statistical test together with the probabilities of 454 
each outcome depending on whether the null-hypothesis is true 455 
 Null Hypothesis 
 True 
Alternate Hypothesis 
True 
Significant Finding False Positive: α True Positive: 1 – β 
Non-Significant 
Finding 
True Negative: 1 – α False Negative: β 
 456 
 457 
 458 
459 
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Tables 460 
 461 
Table 1. A sample of studies in ecology and evolution that quantify rates of under-reporting of important 462 
details of methods or results in the published literature.   463 
 464 
Citation Studies reviewed finding 
Ferreira et al. (2015) 99 studies of litter 
decomposition in streams as an 
effect of nutrient enrichment 
Estimates of decomposition rate presented 
without estimate of uncertainty in 54% of 
studies (even after requesting details 
directly from authors) 
Fidler et al. (2006) 78 articles published in 2005 in 
Conservation Biology and 
Biological Conservation 
58% missing at least one effect size 
51% missing at least one sample size 
85% missing at least one SE or SD 
Parker (2013) 48 studies of plumage color in a 
well-studied European songbird 
species 
409 of 997 main-effect relationships lacked 
information to estimate the strength and/or 
direction of the effect 
Zhang et al. (2012) 54 studies of forest 
productivity as a function of 
tree diversity 
29 studies failed to provide either estimates 
of variance associated with means or 
corresponding sample sizes 
 465 
 466 
  467 
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Figures 468 
 469 
 470 
Figure 1. ‘Business as usual’ in ecology and evolution allows and often promotes practices that keep 471 
many analyses hidden and this leads to biases in the published literature. For example, current practices 472 
(A) could result in only the three ‘unclouded’ graphs making it to publication, leaving the impression that 473 
all results were consistently positive. However, full transparency (B) will sometimes leave a very 474 
different impression of results. In this illustration, we see results that are more complicated and less 475 
consistent, and suggest a much smaller average effect, if any. 476 
477 
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Figure
The instructions for authors state that an “outstanding questions box” is not required, but the 
submission website required a document in this category.  
 
The main purpose of this article is not to stimulate further research into transparency, but to make the 
case to ecologists and evolutionary biologists that editorial policies that promote transparency are 
desirable.  
 
That said, there is certainly room to build our empirical understanding of publication bias and other 
obstacles to transparency, so we will be happy to provide “outstanding questions” if requested.  
 
 
Outstanding Questions
